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THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE XXI. CENTURY: 
RENEWING PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
One of the most visible public sector reform drivers within OECD has been the concept
of performance. Because of assumed positive impacts on performance many reforms
were organised. Because of these realised reforms there was an assumption of better
performance. A study summarising reforms within the OECD on "Modernising
Government: The Way Forward" contributes a key chapter to enhancing public sector
performance: "Governments have become much more performance focused. The
performance movement has increased formalised planning, reporting and control
across many governments" (OECD, 2005, p.11). At the same time there is a qualification
to this statement: "Governments should, however, be wary of overrating the potential of
performance-oriented approaches to change behaviour and culture, and of
underestimating the limitations of performance-based systems" (ibid.).
There is a range of approaches to the role of performance in management. One the
one hand there is a group of disbelievers or non-believers, which consists of post
modern de-constructivists who reduce reality to stories (Bevir e.a., 2003). On the other
hand there are some economic neo-institutionalists which overemphasise principal-
agent assymmetries (Bouckaert, 1998). There is also a group of blind believers of the so-
called New Public Management (Barzelay e.a., 1992) which contrasts with a group of
A szerzõ elemzését azzal kezdi, hogy ma már nem lehet megkerülni a közszol-
gálati szektor teljesítményének mérését. A közszférában azonban a teljesítmény
fogalmának meghatározása sem könnyû feladat. Hasznosnak látszik a teljesít-
mény szempontjából is elkülöníteni egymástól a mikro- , makro-, és a mezoszin-
tet. Mikroszinten az egyes szervezetek szempontjából kell vizsgálni az eredmé-
nyességet. A mezoszint lényegében a helyi önkormányzat szintje, végül a makro-
szint a nemzetállami szintû eredmény. Mindhárom szintre felállíthatók modellek,
amelyek alapján mérhetõvé tehetõ a teljesítmény. Mikroszinten fontos eleme az
eredménynek az állampolgár bizalma a konkrét állami intézményben. Sõt, bizo-
nyos szempontból ez a bizalom tekinthetõ az outputnak, amire törekednie kell a
közszolgáltató intézménynek. A cél soha nem végpont a közszolgáltató szektor
számára. A cél csak egy közbensõ állomás, és ez különösen fontos megállapítás
a középsõ szinten, hiszen itt kell tartósan megalapozni az állami intézményrend-
szerbe vetett bizalmat. A cikk három fontos megállapítást tesz ezen a területen:
1. új koordinációs modellre van szükség a nagy állami programok között (egész-
ségügy, oktatás, stb.) 2. tudományosan is össze kell kapcsolni a konkrét politikai
irányt a közszolgálati menedzsmenttel, és végül 3. be kell vonni a vállalati-gaz-
dálkodási szervezeti formákat a közszolgálati intézmények mûködtetésébe
(könyvvizsgálat, stb.). Makroszinten is három fontos következtetése van a szer-
zõnek: 1. a makroszintû teljesítmény az alapvetõ versenyképességi kérdés, amit
az életminõséggel szoktak mérni a közgazdaságtanban. 2. össze kell hangolni
a politikatudományt és a közszolgálattal foglalkozó menedzsment-ismereteket,
3. meg kell teremteni a kapcsolatot a civil társadalom, a közszolgálatot irányí-
tók és a politikusok között.
managerial sceptics focusing on dysfunctions of performance measurement (De Bruijn,
2002, see also Bouckaert, 1995). Finally there is a group of more equilibrated supporters
that look at the circumstances, the context and the conditions for a functional
performance measurement (Bouckaert, 1996). 
Obviously the concept and the word "performance" has a complexity which
analytically needs to be disentangled to be useful scientifically in describing and
explaining public management reform. It also needs to be refined to be useful from a
practical point of view. Measuring performance is not a neutral exercise. It  is a
managerial activity which does not only costs money and efforts but also, which affects
the behaviour of individuals and organisations. In some cases installing performance
measurement systems, integrating this in documents and procedures, institutionalising
this activity through performance audit institutions, and using it for decisions, allocations
and accountability purposes assumes a 'positive' effect on performance itself. From that
point of view performance is not just the equivalent of 'results', it also becomes the
equivalent of a 'presentation' and it includes, beyond better performance as better
results, also better performance of the performance, or better presentations of (better)
results. The legitimising capacity of a good performance story implies that there is a need
to be able to define standards of performance, and related levels of performance. There
appears to be a cyclical reasoning in defining management, setting priorities in
performance and measurement, provide performance information, generate effects
with this information, support management legitimacy, and again defining management
(Gowler and Legge, 1983; Bouckaert, 1995). 
The role and content of performance differs. There seems to be a need for different
performances for different purposes.
In this article there will be a focus on three levels of performance: micro, meso and
macro performance. Micro performance is at the level of an individual organisation and
its interface with citizens or private organisations. Meso performance is at the level of a
consistent level of consolidated or networked organisations, e.g. local governments, or a
policy field, or a service chain. Finally, macro performance is government wide, or even
governance wide. 
Public sector reform has been focusing on increasing the level and the perception of
performance and its accountability (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Bouckaert and Van
Dooren, 2003). Although evaluating public sector reform policies has been on the agenda
for a while (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; Reichard, 2001; Reichard, 2004; Jann and
Reichard, 2003, Wollman, 2003; ) it is still surprising that the evaluation of performance
measurement and of performance management itself has been underdeveloped, from a
theoretical and from an empirical point of view (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003; Bouckaert
and Peeters, 2002). 
Measuring performance always was present in the history of different public
administration systems in the western world (Williams, 2004; Bouckaert, 1995).
Obviously the scientific management movement has accelerated this, made the design,
implementation and evaluation of measurement systems more explicit, and made the
integration of performance based information in administration, management, and
policy more systematic and systemic. 
The shift from performance administration to performance measurement, and from
a broad, unintegrated and dispersed range of managements of performance (financial,
personnel, contractual, organizational, strategic, etc.) to a coherent and cumulative
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performance management is the twentieth century history. New Public Management has
been a recent but not final stage. Performance governance seems to be announced as a
next stage (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2006, forthcoming).
MICRO PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT
From a systemic point of view graph 1 provides an analytical framework to handle the
complexity of micro public sector performance. 
There are inputs (quantity and quality) which are processed into activities (quantity and
quality), which result in outputs (quantity and quality). These outputs, services or products,
are leaving the black box and are entering society. This is the micro and organisational level
with a direct transfer of an output to a customer. These outputs are sometimes directly
consumable (collected garbage, a passport delivered) but are in many cases just a degree
of availability (which makes them sometimes connected to the analytical level of activities)
(e.g. police patrolling), sometimes even for the next generation (e.g. storage of nuclear
waste), or undividable public goods (e.g. external security by the military).  The
quantitative aspect may be expressed in financial or in physical terms (Hatry, 1999). The
qualitative aspect may be quantified or not. The focus on quality became prominent in
periods of severe savings and shifted from a focus on quality of outputs (as an output
feature) to quality (models) of management at the level of a single organisation (generic
models like e.g. ISO, Balanced Score Card (BSC), European Foundation for Quality
Management (EFQM), or the European Common Assessment Framework (CAF); or
country specific models like the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) in
Canada) which then became a guarantee and safeguard for qualitative output itself (Van
Dooren e.a., 2004).
The assumption of a direct link between input, activities, and outputs suggests a
mechanistic relationship which is based on a machine based, routine featured
production function, linear if possible. Reality is more complex, especially in the public
sector. Since the 1980s the ambition to create typologies or classifications of outputs has
increased. The New Zealand budget system redesign has resulted in an output list, and
academics have described system features which then should facilitate the choice of
guidance, control and evaluation systems (Bouckaert and Halachmi, 1996).
Outputs produce effects. Increasingly quality control systems monitor the quantity
and quality of outputs. But this is not sufficient. Citizens as customers or companies
receive and perceive these outputs with levels of expectations. Expectation levels differ
as do perception levels. In graph 1 there is a clustering of different perceptions (e.g. of
waiting time, or error rate, or timeliness of a service delivery) within expectation levels.
The rational could also be reversed. The confrontation of output quantity and quality,
with individual perception levels and expectation levels results in levels of satisfaction.
This positive or negative satisfaction also influences (positively or negatively) perceptions
and expectations. There is satisfaction because of an effect: a letter has arrived on time,
the right allowance was received, the police prevented a crime, the bus transported the
person to the right place in due time, the municipal sports centre was fit for use, the
garbage collection team collected all the garbage, the roads were fixed, etc. There is an
effect which needs to be measured, e.g. street level cleanliness or crime levels in city
districts which could be as 'objective' as possible, and there is a subjective interpretation
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which is influenced by perceptions and expectations (e.g. feeling of cleanliness, of
security). Research demonstrates that there is not always a good correlation between
the 'objective' and the 'subjective' types of effects.
A crucial final part of the micro model is trust in the individual service delivering
organisation (including e.g. its staff at the window). Trust levels have an impact on
satisfaction (Bouckaert and Vandewalle, 2005; Vandewalle, 2005) and are in many cases
crucial for a proper functioning of service delivery. The degree of trust of public sector
organisations in their citizens (and vice versa) are a crucial societal mechanism to
construct control systems. Lacking or decreasing trust levels require complementary
(repressive or monitoring based) additional control systems. Sufficient and increasing
trust levels allow to use this social capital to upgrade, through satisfaction and legitimacy
levels, support for service delivery. This contributes to its effectiveness. Trust levels also
have an impact on effects. Teaching in schools, hospital therapies, or policed security
will be more effective if parents and children trust their teachers, if patients trust their
doctors, if citizens trust their security services. In the field of co-production, trust is
crucial to upgrade the same output quantity and quality to higher levels of effectiveness. 
The UK National Audit Office has conducted research on the a range of allowances
and the quality of the delivery. Obviously people's perception, expectations and levels of
satisfaction may be affected by the fact that their application may have been rejected or
that the level of allowance is much lower than expected. 
The result (table 1) demonstrates that is does make sense to make clusters of waiting
times. This research does not include the effect levels nor the satisfaction levels or trust
levels. For the group which had to wait for longer than three months (and which
represent 38% of the sample), 10% still considered this to be quicker than expected, 34%
thought this at the level of their expectations, and 50% considered this to be below their
expectations. A crucial management question is whether this overall result is acceptable. 
There are three levels of implications of this micro performance model.
First, trust is also an input for the public sector, not just an outcome or effect.  To the
extent that trust is crucial for the legitimacy of an organisation and for support of its
resource allocation, trust should also be labeled as an 'income' (connected to input), not
just an outcome. Also trust may have an impact on effect levels or satisfaction levels.
Scientifically public sector management theories should increasingly include topics
as expectations management, perception management (which in a combined form is
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Graph 1: Micro public sector performance model
public sector marketing), and trust management. Crucial but underestimated models
like Parasuraman e.a.'s gap analysis is crucial to bridge an internal and an external public
sector management focus (Parasuraman e.a., 1985). This gap analysis looks at real
service delivery, intended and planned, perceived and communicated. To the extent that
there are gaps between these categories, satisfaction and trust will be under pressure. 
From a practical point of view improving 'micro performance' requires to integrate
also citizen groups, use focus groups, and to actively look for the group of discontent
(distrusting and dissatisfied) customers and citizens. To the extent that these efforts
affect trust, this may increase the levels of effects.
MESO PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT
Output is never an end in itself for the public sector. The more output is an end in itself,
the easier it can be transferred to the private sector. The less it is an end in itself the more
it belongs to the public sector. Output is not an end in itself if the subsequent
intermediate and ultimate effects or outcomes are a central focus. Since effects or
outcomes are realized by a range of organizations, public sector performance
measurement systems should not just be organized at the individual organizational
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All
War 
Pensions
Mobility
Allowance
Attendance
Allowance
Invalid Care
Allowance
Number of
respondents
1.036 175 202 409 250
How long overall
to hear result?
Up to 1 month
5% 1% 5% 4% 15%
1-2 months 21% 1% 22% 22% 26%
2-3 months 28% 5% 32% 28% 26%
Longer 38% 86% 33% 37% 28%
Time taken 
(all 1.036 files)
Up to 1 month
Between 
1 and 2 months
Between 
2 and 3 months
Longer 
Quicker or 
slower, or 
as expected
% % % %
Quicker 67 52 34 10
As expected 33 39 42 34
Slower 0 4 19 50
Table 1: Time taken for the claim process (objective), and claimant's expectations. NAO, 1992, p.14
(micro) level but also at the level of a policy field or a product/service chain which could
co-incide with a level of government as well. This is the meso-level. Outcomes and
effects may be objective or subjective. Also outcomes and effects are affected by the
changing policy environment. This results in the construction of 'logic models' (Hatry,
1999) that represent a sequens of outputs, intermediate outcomes and effects, and
ultimate and final outcomes and effects. These logic models are designed, in many
cases, by sectorial policy specialist. 
Nevertheless, these models and sequences are not linear, there are disconnections.
This results in a 'First Grand Canyon' in the public sector measurement system between
outputs on the one side of the canyon, and a disrupted and distant, almost unreachable,
but visible sequence of intermediate and ultimate effects and outcomes on the other
side of the canyon. 
The generalised absence of market mechanisms in the public sector, even if quasi-
markets are being established, the politically based value assessment of  (effect)
priorities, the changing perceptions and expectations of the citizenry and civil society,
and environmental contingencies, result in a disrupted link between outputs and
(intermediate outcomes and) objective and subjective effects.
From the end outcomes and effects to (meso) trust a 'Second Grand Canyon'
emerges. Effective school, health or security policies and systems could lead to a level of
trust in these policies and systems, and this trust could facilitate their effectiveness. 
The meso model (graph 2) will be illustrated using a study by the Dutch Social
Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP,2004). 
In the field of education it is possible to have two summary graphs (SCP, p. 117)
linking inputs (euro per capita) to effects (based on the OECD PISA tests), and linking
effects and trust.
In graph 3, Canada, Finland, and New Zealand belong to the effective set of countries,
and they are at a high level of effectiveness. Czechia, Hungary and Poland technically
spoken are also on the effective envelope, but  at a low level of effectiveness, and below
a cut off level of effectiveness of score five. They reach this result with less resources
spend compared to Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Germany. 
Germany, in average, spends approximately as much money (per capita) as Belgium,
the Netherlands, Ireland and Finland. However, its effectiveness is much lower compared
to these countries. In comparison to Finland the effectiveness is almost half of it.
Obviously there is a wide Länder variance within Germany. It would be useful to repeat
the study and map all the German Länder or US States in stead of country averages.
The other countries below the effective envelope spend more money for the same
level of effectiveness, or spend the same amount of money for a lower level of
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Graph 2: Meso public sector performance model
effectiveness, or have a combination of more money spend and a lesser degree of
effectiveness compared to New Zealand, Finland, and Canada. These three countries are
cost-effective because there is no other observation that spends less and has a higher
level of effectiveness. Of course this does not imply that they cannot further improve their
position.
Graph 4 includes only European figures and links effectiveness and trust, suggesting
that higher levels of effectiveness correlate with higher levels of trust. Finland takes the
best position in this international benchmark. This correlation could be causality. More
effectiveness could result in more trust, or more trust could trigger higher levels of
effectiveness, especially in education.
The same analysis may be developed in the field of health policy. The following two
graphs demonstrate the linkages of input/ effect and input/ trust (SCP, p. 177, 179.).
There seems to be a clustering of countries in a cost-effectiveness range where Canada,
Germany, and Luxemburg are more on the expensive side. There are four new EU
countries, including Hungary, but also Portugal, and of course the US as negative outliers. 
In graph 6, input and trust are linked, demonstrating some correlation between both
dimensions. Again the US is a negative outlier.
This set of graphs demonstrates comparative performance analysis. It is useful,
possible and necessary. Also it pushes to ask questions on the links between inputs,
outputs, effects, and trust. Although there are many technical problems to have
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Graph 3: Cost-effectiveness of education (Link 4) (SCP, 2004, p. 117)
comparable data, one could replicate these studies within countries for schools,
hospitals, police stations, or municipalities. These tables have the function of flash lights
for policy and management. In structuring the debate according to an analytical scheme
it becomes possible to talk about resource allocation, output priorities, price/quality and
willingness to pay, effectiveness of service delivery and policies (also to specific target
groups), and potential to trust these specific institutions.
There are three levels of implications of this meso performance model.
First, there is a need for new co-ordination mechanisms between projects of major
programmes, between organisations, between stages of a service chain, especially after
the disastrous organisational fragmentation driven by the NPM ideology (Verhoest and
Bouckaert, 2005). There are efforts for an integration of organisational strategic plans and
for cross-organisational policy design. There is more implementation using a holding
concept through consolidated budgets, or an integration of organisational (performance)
audits and policy evaluations.
Second, scientifically there is a need to connect public management to policy
sciences. It is the linkages between what happens inside the black box and the logic
models that needs to be developed.
Thirdly, from a practical point of view there is a need to integrate managerial and
policy related professional communities (e.g. auditors and evaluators), 
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Graph 4: Effectiveness-Trust (confidence) in education (SCP, 2004, p.117.)
MACRO PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT
The macro level is government wide or even country wide. Increasingly synthetic
indicators at a country level (e.g. Word Competitiveness Yearbook or Growth
Competitiveness Index) include public sector performance as an indicator (government
efficiency) (IMD, 2005). According to the World Competitiveness Index government
efficiency is estimated along five dimensions: public finance, fiscal policy, institutional
framework (including survey data on government decisions, political parties,
transparency, public service, bureaucracy, and bribing and corruption), business
legislation, and societal framework (including survey data on justice, risk of political
stability, social cohesion, discrimination, and gender issues). 
One could say that even societal outcomes and effects  are not an end in itself in the
public sector. The ultimate ambition is to guarantee a functional level of trust by the
members of a 'res publica' in the State, in all its institutions and organisations, but especially
in its public institutions and organizations. Again, linking effects to trust is the 'Second
Grand Canyon' in the public sector. The assumption that effects may positively influence
trust is weak and has not been corroborated by theories nor empirical studies (Bouckaert
e.a., 2002; Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003; Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003).
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Graph 5: Cost-effectiveness of health (SCP, 2004, p.177.)
However, public sector reform has always, implicitly or explicitly, referred to this
ambition to bridge this Second Grand Canyon. Again, if we have reached the other side
of the First Grand Canyon, mostly politicians, but also administrators and professionals
eagerly look at the other side of this Second Grand Canyon. However, the discontented
society is rejecting this self-fulfilling prophecy. But the ambitions remain present. The
rational of high impact agencies to construct the bridges remains a hypothesis. The role
of politicians in helping to construct the second bridge is clear.
Graph 7 shows this disrupted relationship and links the five boxes of inputs, activities,
outputs, effects (which should be read as intermediate and ultimate outcomes/effects),
and trust, and the seven logical linkages between these five boxes.
A concrete Canadian example is shown in graph 8. Canada's performance, as a
country consists of 6 themes operationalised in 23 outcomes with 32 indicators.
Obviously, this macro perspective on performance also refers to a consolidation and
integration of meso and macro levels. 
There are three levels of implications of this macro performance model.
First, increasingly government wide indicators are being used. The need to show the
value added of the public sector for a country's competitiveness results in international
benchmarks of quality of life indicators. It is therefore important to link the macro level
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Graph 6: Input-trust relationship in Health  (SCP, 2004, p.179)
to meso and micro (desintegration), but also to consolidate the micro and meso levels
into a macro level. 
Second, management science, and policy science need to be connected to and
linked to political science. 
Third, from a practical point of view, there is a need to bridge performance
information, between the public sector, executive politicians, legislative politicians, and
civil society. This is the governance performance perspective.
Consolidating micro-meso-macro public sector performance and its challenges
It is possible to apply the above described scheme at the level of an individual
organization (micro level), at the level of a policy field (meso level), at the level of a
consolidated government wide level (macro level) (graph 9).
This requires a performance measurement policy. Crucial elements in designing
measurement systems for the public sector at micro, meso, and macro level are
perceived positive cost-benefit analyses of performance measurement at all levels.
A problematic issue is the assymetrical Cost Benefit Analysis of a performance
measurement system. Costs of performance measurement systems (PMS) are
unconditional, tangible and immediate. Their benefits are conditional, intangible and
scheduled for the future.
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Graph 7: Macro performance model
The benefits of a PMS depend on the transformation of data into information, and even
more on the use of this information in policy and management cycles for the purpose of
improved decision making, better (motivated) allocation of resources, strategies of results
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Graph 8: Canada's Whole of Government Framework (TBS)
Graph 9: Integrating micro-meso-macro performance models
improvement, perceptions of evolutions in real performance, and improved accountability
on results. Benefits are therefore conditional (depending on using information), intangible
(how do you value knowledge on improvement, better decisions, better accountability),
and scheduled for the future (going through learning cycles takes time).
Costs on the other hand are unconditional (one has to pay for collection, storage,
processing of data, diffusion of information, evaluation and auditing), tangible
(measurable), and immediate (almost real time).
At the same time, evidence based policy and management, and risk assessments
require responsible strategies to look into the future. Ashby's law of requisite variety
implies that monitoring systems of complex institutions and policies should have a
proportional complexity depending on the features of these institutions and policies,
whether they are controllable or not. This results in six performance measurement
challenges for a volatile government. 
SIX FURTHER CHALLENGES FOR A VOLATILE GOVERNMENT AND 
ITS MEASUREMENT IMPLICATIONS
Increasingly six main challenges emerge as a strategic governance agenda: Integration,
Vision, Effectiveness, Internationalization, Trust and legitimacy, and Responsiveness
(Bouckaert, Ormond, Peters, 2000). Each of these challenges requires a special focus on
the measurement implications of the related performance aspect.
Increasingly, the public sector is about managing across government. In two
dimensions managing across government means horizontally across boarder lines
with the private and not for profit sector, and vertically across levels of government.
Value added chain management, e.g. the food chain, or the security chain, are
examples of a responsible government that needs to focus on its own parts of the chain
but also on the chain itself. Addressing issues that respect no organizational
boundaries in an effective cross governmental way is probably the most shared
concern of governments today.
There is a significant performance measurement  implication derived from this first
challenge. Performance measurement systems and the related management systems
should have the capacity to be functional at a micro level (within organizational
boundaries) but they should also have the capacity of consolidation at the meso level
(policy field), and meso levels should have the capacity to be consolidated at the macro
level (government wide). A reverse system of deconsolidation (macro with mesos; meso
with micros) should also be possible. Especially the meso level is a crucial pivot, as the
above graphs are demonstrating.
A second challenge  is to guarantee the capacity to develop a balanced strategic view
of the public interest. This involves putting short term projects in a longer term
perspective and in the context of budget realities, taking into account the views of civil
society and individual citizens.
Balancing professionalized policy making by administrators, stakeholders and
interest groups and legitimized policy making in a democratic system is increasingly
complex in itself. This complexity increases when risk assessments require a
combination of quick responses to immediate and urgent problems and long term
solutions for important problems.
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The performance measurement/management  implication derived from this is that a
Balanced Stakeholders Card (BSC) is needed with all the features of a Balanced Score Card.
A third key challenge is a focus on the effects/outcome part of the analytical
framework (graph 1). The pivot of the whole scheme is the box with the (intermediate
and final) outcomes or effects, and the related links of effectiveness (output/effect) and
cost-effectiveness (input/effect). Bridging the First Grand Canyon is a prime concern for
the public sector. Economy and efficiency are secondary concerns. Confidence is a
derived concern. 
It is of no use to be economical and efficient if one cannot guarantee effectiveness. It
is avoidable that, given one's effectiveness, a public sector is uneconomical and
inefficient. Analytically there is a need to know to what extent effectiveness is influencing
economy and efficiency and vice versa. 
In the context of integration and vision, today's challenge is also to draw on a much
wider set of means and networks of relationships in order to implement public
programmes successfully, and achieve desired outcomes.
This third challenge has a performance measurement and management
implication. There is a need to monitor the effectiveness of Value Added Chains of
mixes of hierarchies, networks and markets. One way to organize this is to have policy
field based (Canadian) Management Accountability Framework (or similar models like
e.g. CAF of EFQM)
Globalisation and internationalization, especially for smaller countries, imply
adapting domestically, and influencing others to mutual benefit. As frontiers get lower,
smaller countries have relatively more to gain by timely organizational and economic
adjustment, while external co-ordination impacts on all government activity.
The immediate performance measurement  implication is the need for international
benchmarking. Obviously there should be minimal standards of comparison, but the
above mentioned examples clearly show this is possible, useful and necessary. 
Focusing on the Second Grand Canyon is also a major challenge and will include
building new societal relationships. No country is immune to a decline in trust. This
requires
anticipatory action by governments to bring about responsible engagement of
citizens, and make them confident that their public institutions cater to their needs.
Levels of trust and confidence are related to the politico-administrative culture of a
country. Whereas Americans, almost by definition, distrust their governments,
Scandinavians, almost by definition, trust their governments. Optimal levels of trust and
confidence are functional because this helps to define optimal control systems which
are the indispensable complement to make systems function.
A logical performance measurement/management implication is to link quality,
satisfaction and trust in an empirical way. Analysis, explanation and policies should
follow from this information, taking into account the two way traffic of more quality leads
to more satisfaction which leads to more trust on the one hand, or more trust increases
the chances of higher satisfaction, which increases the chances of a better perception of
quality.
Finally, adapting to change in a volatile environment is crucial. More than ever, an
unpredictable environment requires governments to have the capacity to scan ahead,
detect trends and think creatively about ways of shaping policies and institutions to
respond to new challenges. 
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The immediate performance measurement  implication is to generate the capacity
for administrations to extrapolations and simulations. 
CONCLUSION
Public sector performance measurement is being adjusted and subject to reform just like
public management itself. Looking at measurement from a coherent micro, meso and
macro perspective, within a framework of trust building initiatives happens increasingly
in the context of the major challenges of the public sector itself. 
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